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COUNTY COURT OF NEW YORK
WESTCHESTER COUNTY
People v. Zherkal
(decided February 25, 2009)
On October 31, 2008, Selim Zherka was arrested and charged
"with two counts of disorderly conduct." 2 He filed a cause of action
in federal district court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that his
constitutional rights were violated as a result of the disorderly con-
duct charges. 3 Zherka "issued a subpoena for the Westchester Coun-
ty District Attorney [("DA"), Janet DiFiore,] to . . . testify" regarding
the incident that led to his arrest.4  Subsequently, the government
moved to quash the subpoena.s In opposition, Zherka filed a motion
and argued that denying his motion would in effect violate his consti-
tutional right under the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth
Amendment.6 Ultimately, the court granted the government's motion
and quashed the subpoena.'
"Zherka was charged ... with two counts of disorderly con-
duct" that arose out of an incident that took place at "1 Roosevelt
Square [in] Mount Vernon, New York."8 On November 10, 2008, he
filed a § 1983 claim in the Southern District of New York relating to
the alleged disorderly conduct.9 Zherka claimed that there was "a
conspiracy by numerous Mount Vernon city officials to violate [his]
No. 08-5013, 2009 WL 482366, at *1 (Westchester County Ct. Feb. 25, 2009).
2 Id (citation omitted).
Id
Id
6 Zherka, 2009 WL 482366, at *1. See also U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal pros-
ecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor .... ). See also Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18 (1967) (noting
that the United States Supreme Court has extended the Sixth Amendment compulsory
process right to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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federal constitutional rights." 0
Prior to trial, Zherka issued a subpoena for the DA to testify
as to the circumstances surrounding his October arrest." The gov-
ernment opposed the subpoena and filed a motion to quash it.12 In re-
sponse, Zherka filed his own motion with the Westchester County
Court, but the court granted the government's motion and quashed
the subpoena.
Under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion, the accused has the right to subpoena "witnesses in his favor."' 4
Even though the DA presented a signed affirmation that she was not
at the scene when the arrest took place and did not "have any person-
al knowledge of the events that led to the defendant's arrest," Zherka
subpoenaed her to testify as to the circumstances surrounding his ar-
rest.' 5 It is well established that a court may prevent a witness from
testifying where the witness does not have first hand knowledge re-
garding the facts and circumstances surrounding the charges brought
against the defendant.' 6 Because of the DA's physical absence at the
event that led to Zherka's arrest and her lack of personal knowledge,
the court found that she was a hostile witness with "no relevant in-
formation to offer."" Therefore, the court granted the government's
motion and quashed Zherka's subpoena because he failed to offer any
evidence why "the [DA's] testimony would be relevant."
Although the Bill of Rights was ratified in 1791, the United
States Supreme Court did not address "the right of an accused to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor" until 1967
10 Id.
" Id
12 Zherka, 2009 WL 482366, at *I.
13 id.
14 U.S. CONST. amend. VI, states, in pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the ac-
cused shall enjoy the right . . . to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor. . . ."
" Zherka, 2009 WL 482366, at *2 (noting that Zherka and the Mount Vernon City Mayor,
Clinton Young, had a reported but unsworn conversation concerning alleged misconduct by
the DA, which influenced his decision to subpoena her).
16 Id. at *1 ("If the court has discretion to limit cross-examination of a witness, then con-
comitantly, it has the authority to preclude a witness from testifying where that witness lacks
any direct or first hand information about the charges against the defendant.").
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in Washington v. Texas.' 9 In Washington, the Court determined that
an individual's right to compel witnesses to testify is a vital part of
that individual's ability to build a defense. 20 The Washington Court
stated that "[j]ust as an accused has the right to confront the [gov-
ernment's] witnesses for the purpose of challenging their testimony,
he has the right to present his own witnesses to establish a defense." 21
The Court determined that the trial court did not allow the defendant
to put on "a witness who was physically and mentally capable of tes-
tifying to events that he had personally observed," and who was able
to offer testimony that was "relevant and material to [his] defense." 22
Therefore, the Washington Court concluded that the defendant's right
to compel witnesses in his favor was violated.
Evidentiary rules have played an important role in the Court's
treatment of a criminal defendant's constitutional right to compulsory
process. In Chambers v. Mississippi,24 the United States Supreme
Court held that a defendant is not afforded a fair trial when eviden-
tiary rules preclude him from calling witnesses in his favor.25 In that
case, the witnesses for the defense would have testified that another
suspect, McDonald, had made inculpatory statements on the night of
the shooting that implicated him as the shooter, which would have
exonerated Chambers.26 The Supreme Court of Mississippi denied
Chambers' request to cross-examine McDonald based on the "com-
mon-law rule that a party may not impeach his own witness."27 This
common-law rule is supported by the notion that when a party calls a
witness to testify on his behalf, he " 'vouches for [the witness's] cre-
dibility.' "28 However, the Supreme Court found this voucher rule to
be obsolete and not practical in modem-day criminal trials.29 The
'9 Washington, 388 U.S. at 17.
20 Id. at 19.
21 Id. (recognizing that "[t]his right is a fundamental element of due process of law").
22 Id. at 23 (footnote omitted) ("The Framers of the Constitution did not intend to commit
the futile act of giving to a defendant the right to secure the attendance of witnesses whose
testimony he had no right to use.").
23 id.
24 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
25 Id. at 302-03.
26 Id. at 289.
27 Id. at 295.
28 Id. (quoting Clark v. Lansford, 191 So. 2d 123, 125 (Miss. 1966)).
29 Chambers, 410 U.S. at 296. The Court stated:
2010] 879
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Court also noted that although the evidentiary rule against hearsay is
crucial in jury trials, hearsay exceptions have been created for situa-
tions where testimony is likely to be trustworthy and crucial to the
defendant's case. 30  According to the Court, "where constitutional
rights directly affecting the ascertainment of guilt are implicated, the
hearsay rule may not be applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of
justice."'
Fifteen years later in Taylor v. Illinois,32 the Court's ruling
was quite the opposite from the Chambers decision. The Taylor
Court considered the issue of whether a defendant's constitutional
rights are violated when he is barred from calling a witness in his fa-
vor because of a violation of a discovery rule.33 In Taylor, the defen-
dant contended that the Sixth Amendment is an absolute right and
that a preclusion sanction is never permissible.34 However, the Court
did not agree with this argument when it noted that the accused does
not have an unlimited right to compel witnesses in his favor.35 For
example, the Court stated that defendants do not have an absolute
right to compel "testimony that is incompetent, privileged, or other-
wise inadmissible."36 The accused cannot exercise his Sixth
Amendment right without restrictions because there are public inter-
ests that must be taken into account, such as the integrity of the ad-
versarial process, fairness, upholding justice, and the potential for un-
fair prejudice at trial.37 The Court held that the Compulsory Process
Whatever validity the "voucher" rule may have once enjoyed, and apart
from whatever usefulness it retains today in the civil trial process, it
bears little present relationship to the realities of the criminal process. It
might have been logical for the early common law .... But in modem
criminal trials, defendants are rarely able to select their witnesses: they
must make them where they find them.
Id. (internal footnotes omitted).
30 Id. at 302.
31 Id. But see Maness v. Wainwright, 512 F.2d 88, 92 (5th Cir. 1975) (noting that based
on the trial record, the unreliability of hearsay testimony and the unavailability of evidence,
that the application of the voucher rule "did not deprive [the defendant] of a trial in accord
with notions of fundamental fairness embodied in the due process clause").
32 484 U.S. 400 (1988).
3 Id. at 401-02.
3 Id at 410.
SId.
36 Id.
37 Taylor, 484 U.S. at 414-15.
[Vol. 26880
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Clause does not prohibit a court from imposing a sanction (i.e. pre-
venting the testimony of a potential defense witness) in response to a
discovery rule violation.
Once a court conducts an in camera review and determines
that a file contains material information, a defendant is entitled access
to such documents.39 In Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, the defendant was
charged with, inter alia, rape and incest against his thirteen-year-old
daughter. 40 The government alleged that Ritchie assaulted his daugh-
ter several times a week and that she had reported the assaults to law
enforcement and Children and Youth Services ("CYS"). 4 1 Ritchie
subpoenaed CYS for the records relating to his daughter, but CYS re-
fused to turn over any files on the ground that the records were privi-
leged and confidential. 42 However, under Pennsylvania law, privi-
leged records are subject to eleven exceptions, one of which requires
"agenc[ies to] disclose . . . reports to a 'court of competent jurisdic-
tion pursuant to a court order.' "43 Ritchie argued that he had a right
to the information because the files may have contained the identifi-
cation of witnesses that would testify in his favor or would provide
exculpatory evidence. 44 In addition, he specifically requested a med-
ical file that CYS compiled in 1978, but the trial judge refused his re-
quest, finding credibility in a CYS employee's statement that the file
did not contain the medical information Ritchie was looking for.4 5
Subsequently, Ritchie was convicted on all charges and sentenced to
three to ten years' imprisonment.46
After a series of appeals, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court de-
termined that Ritchie's Sixth Amendment right to compulsory
process was violated when CYS did not turn over the requested med-
3 Id. at 409. There is a need for limits because the purpose of the Compulsory Process
Clause would be offended if it were interpreted to include an absolute right to even allow
suspected perjury testimony at trial. Id. at 416.
39 Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 58 (1987).
40 Id at 43.
41id
42 id
43 Id. at 43-44 (internal citation omitted).
4 Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 44.
45 Id. The trial judge even acknowledged that he did not actually study the whole file to
verify that the medical report was not in the record. Id at 44 n.3.
46 Id. at 45.
2010] 881
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ical file.4 7 Ritchie argued that the trial court precluded him from ac-
cessing the names of favorable witnesses and other potentially excul-
patory evidence that was contained in the file. 4 8 It is well-established
Sixth Amendment jurisprudence that a criminal defendant must be
afforded with the government's assistance in obtaining favorable wit-
nesses at trial or evidence that might have an impact on the defen-
dant's guilt or innocence. 49 According to the Court, the government
is "obligat[ed] to turn over evidence in its possession that is both fa-
vorable to the accused and material to guilt or punishment."so
The Court recognized the policy implications in protecting
this information, but also noted that the public interest should not
override the possibility of disclosure in all cases. Without any clear
governmental policy precluding disclosure in every criminal prosecu-
tion, the Court found that relevant information should be disclosed so
that "a court of competent jurisdiction [can] determine[] [if] the in-
formation is 'material' to the" defendant's case.52 Therefore, the
Court concluded that Ritchie was entitled to access the CYS file sub-
ject to an in camera examination by the trial court to decide whether
the file contained material information.
The right to compulsory process is not absolute and, in order
to compel a witness to testify on his behalf, the defendant must make
a reasonable showing of how the testimony is "material and favorable
to his defense." 54 In United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, the defen-
dant claimed that the deportation of two eyewitnesses violated "his
Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process for obtaining favora-
47 Id. at 55.
48 Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 44.
49 Id. at 56.
50 Id. at 57 (emphasis added) (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963)). The
Court found that " '[e]vidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had
the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been dif-
ferent.' " Id. (emphasis added) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473
U.S. 667, 682 (1985)).
5 Id.
S2 Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 58.
5 Id. (noting that if the file contained information that was material the defendant must be
given a new trial, but if the file did not contain any material information the prior conviction
may be reinstated by the lower court).
54 United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867 (1982) (footnote omitted).
882 [Vol. 26
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ble witnesses."5 The defendant, a citizen of Mexico, was indicted
for transporting an individual in violation of federal law. 56 After in-
terviewing the defendant and other passengers, an Assistant United
States Attorney determined that the passengers did not offer any ma-
terial information for the government or any supporting evidence for
the defense.5 ' Thus, the government deported the two passengers
back to Mexico.5 8 The defendant asserted that the government's de-
portation of the passengers did not afford him a sufficient opportunity
to speak to them "to determine whether they could aid in his de-
fense."59 However, the defendant failed to make an effort to explain
how the deported passengers could aid in his defense.60
The Court found that the Sixth Amendment does not guaran-
tee a criminal defendant the right to ensure the appearance and "tes-
timony of any and all witnesses," but rather "it guarantees him 'com-
pulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.' "61 Therefore,
the defendant could not argue that his Sixth Amendment right to
compulsory process was violated by "merely ... showing that [the]
deportation of the passengers deprived him of their testimony." 62 Ra-
ther, the Court explained that the defendant must make some reason-
able "showing of how their testimony would have been both material
and favorable to his defense." 63 As a result of the defendant's failure
to show how the testimony he wished to offer would have been ma-
terial and favorable, the Court concluded that he did not prove an in-
fringement of his Sixth Amendment right.64
The New York Constitution does not contain an analog to the
s Id. at 861.
6 Id. at 860.
Id. at 861.
58 Id.
5 Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. at 861.
60 Id. (noting that Valenzuela-Bemal's defense was that he was unaware that the individu-
al he transported was an illegal alien).
61 Id at 867 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VI).
62 id
63 Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). See also People v. Chipp, 552 N.E.2d 608,
613 (N.Y. 1990) (holding that the right to compulsory process "is not absolute"); People v.
Hendrix, 820 N.Y.S.2d 411, 417 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 2006) (holding that the defendants
did not establish any "[Sixth Amendment] compulsory process right to compel a non-
governmental agency to turn over prior witness statements").
64 Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. at 874.
2010] 883
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Compulsory Process Clause of the United States Constitution, but the
United States Supreme Court extended the right of criminal defen-
dants to subpoena "witnesses in [their] favor" to the states through
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in Washington
v. Texas. 65 Even though the New York Constitution does not contain
its own version of the Sixth Amendment's Compulsory Process
Clause, it is important to analyze how New York courts have inter-
preted the federal provision. In reaching its conclusion, the Zherka
court primarily relied on People v. King.66 In King, the defendants
were accused of participating in a protest inside Saint Patrick's Ca-
thedral during a mass where Archbishop John Cardinal O'Connor
was present.67 As a result of their demonstration, the defendants were
arrested and charged with disorderly conduct, trespass, resisting ar-
rest, and disruption of religious service.68 The defense subpoenaed
Cardinal O'Connor to testify at trial and, in response, the Cardinal
moved to quash the subpoena claiming that he did not have relevant
knowledge. 69 In support of his motion to quash the subpoena, Car-
dinal O'Connor argued that the subpoena was a form of harassment.70
On the other hand, the defendants contended that Cardinal
O'Connor's testimony was relevant and essential "because he [was]
the person they [were] alleged to have disrupted."7
The King court noted that if the Cardinal's testimony was
considered to be material and relevant to the defendants' guilt or in-
nocence, the defendants' Sixth Amendment right to call witnesses in
their favor could not be denied.72 The defendants asserted that Car-
dinal O'Connor's state of mind as to whether he believed to have
been disrupted was a material and relevant issue for trial. However,
the court found that Cardinal O'Connor's testimony pertaining to his
6s Washington, 388 U.S. at 18 ("The right of an accused to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor stands on no lesser footing than the other Sixth Amendment
rights that we have previously held applicable to the States.").
66 561 N.Y.S.2d 395 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 1990).




7' King, 561 N.Y.S.2d at 396.
72 id.
7 Id. at 397.
[Vol. 26884
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state of mind in abruptly ending his homily and changing the direc-
tion of the service was not relevant or material to the questions at tri-
al.7 4 Instead, the court stated that "[t]he issue . . . is whether the al-
leged actions of [the] defendants caused a disturbance which
interfered with the ability to celebrate the mass of those gathered at
the cathedral."75 Furthermore, the court held that the testimony of
Cardinal O'Connor was neither relevant nor material to any of the
crimes, and therefore, granted the motion to quash the defense's sub-
poena.76
For criminal defendants to call witnesses in their favor, they
must show some close connection between the potential witness and
their defense.77 In People v. Monroe, the defendant asserted that he
was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to call witnesses in his
favor when the court did not allow the guidance counselor of an ad-
verse witness to appear and testify to matters concerning the wit-
ness's domestic affairs.78 The court found that the testimony of the
guidance counselor was too remote from the question of the "wit-
ness's bias or motive to fabricate." 79 The Appellate Division, Second
Department, concluded that the lower court appropriately exercised
its discretion in not allowing the defendant to present the testimony
of the guidance counselor.o
Additionally, a defendant is not entitled to compel documents
if they are solely sought to impeach the witness's credibility.81 In
People v. Gissendanner, the defendant issued subpoenas duces tecum
to obtain the personnel records of two police officers who were the
main witnesses testifying against him.82 Officer Ronald Eisenhauer
testified that he acted as an undercover investigator who negotiated
with Gissendanner to purchase illegal drugs.8 Gissendanner's testi-
mony was inconsistent with Officer Eisenhaur's testimony in that he
74 id.
75 id.
76 King, 561 N.Y.S.2d at 397.
7 See People v. Monroe, 817 N.Y.S.2d 150, 152 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 2006).
78 Id at 151, 152.
7 Id. at 152.
80 Id.
8! People v. Gissendanner, 399 N.E.2d 924, 927 (N.Y. 1979).
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denied ever selling drugs to him.84 The defense sought to introduce
the officers' personnel records as trial strategy to impeach their cre-
dibility and sway the jury into believing that they conjured up a sto-
ry.8 5 The court noted that the guarantee of compulsory process, when
balanced with the confidentiality of police personnel records, does
not always prevail. 86 In the court's view, "though access must be af-
forded to otherwise confidential data [that is] relevant and material to
the determination of guilt or innocence, . . . there is no such compul-
sion when requests to examine records are motivated by nothing
more than impeachment of witnesses' general credibility."8 7 Defense
counsel made no inquiry into which of the records might have had
some bearing on the guilt or innocence of the defendant. Therefore,
the court was justified in denying the application.89
Likewise, a defendant is entitled to access surveillance tapes
when they depict events leading to his arrest, but not if they are
sought exclusively for impeachment purposes. 90 The principle set
forth in Gissendanner, that "there is no compulsion when requests to
examine records are motivated by nothing more than impeachment of
witnesses' general credibility,"91 was of important application in
People v. Giler.92 In Giler, the defendant was "charged with resisting
arrest, attempted assault in the third degree, and disorderly conduct"
for an incident that took place outside the 14th/Midtown South Police
84 id.
8 id.
86 Gissendanner, 399 N.E.2d at 927.
[T]he constitutional roots of the guarantees of compulsory process and
confrontation may entitle these to a categorical primacy over the State's
interest in safeguarding the confidentiality of police personnel records,
[but] it is not to be assumed that, . . . police confidentiality must always
yield to the demands of a defendant.
Id
87 Id.
18 Id. at 928.
89 Id. Those seeking the records must make a "good faith [showing] of some factual pre-
dicate which would make it reasonably likely that the file will bear such fruit and that the
quest for its contents is not merely a desperate grasping at a straw." Gissendanner, 399
N.E.2d at 928.
90 People v. Giler, No. 2008NY016624, 2008 WL 2169910, at *1, *2 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct.
May 22, 2008).
91 Gissendanner, 399 N.E.2d at 927.
92 Giler, 2008 WL 2169910, at *2 (citing Gissendanner, 399 N.E.2d at 927).
[Vol. 26886
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Precinct in Manhattan. 93 The defendant issued a subpoena to retrieve
all surveillance tapes that caught the incident on camera. 94 The non-
party New York City Police Department ("NYPD") moved to quash
the subpoena asserting that the defendant could not obtain the surveil-
lance footage because it was governed by the rules of discovery.95
The defendant in Giler did not seek to subpoena routine police re-
ports produced from the investigation of the crime, but rather sought
to obtain surveillance footage portraying the actual confrontation
"giving rise to the criminal charges."96 The surveillance tapes were
" 'relevant and material to the determination of guilt or innocence' "
because they depicted a live and comprehensive picture of the actual
incident, and were "not sought solely in the speculative hope of un-
earthing possible 'impeachment of witnesses' general credibility.' "97
Thus, the defendant was entitled to obtain the surveillance tapes via a
subpoena duces tecum. 98
Similar to the defendant in Ritchie, the defendant in People v.
Thurston99 sought to obtain records from a children's center to help
build a defense.100 Following a jury trial, the defendant was con-
victed of sodomy, sexual abuse, and endangering the welfare of a
child.10' On appeal, he argued that he was denied a fair trial because
of erroneous evidentiary rulings.1 02 According to the defendant, the
trial court denied him his Sixth Amendment protection when it de-
nied his subpoena for the children's center records of the two victims
that would have disclosed the abuse. 03 In support of the subpoena,
the defendant argued that the records were relevant and material to
his defense.104 However, the trial court found the records to be "illeg-
9 Id. at *1.
94 id
9 Id.
96 Id. at *2.
" Giler, 2008 WL 2169910, at *2 (quoting Gissendanner, 399 N.E.2d at 927).
98 Id. at *3.




103 Id. at 466.
104 Thurston, 619 N.Y.S.2d at 466 ("[H]is defense [was] that the children were manipu-
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ible and contained nothing that would bolster or support anything that
ha[d not] been said in [the] courtroom already."105  The appellate
court agreed with the defendant and held that the records were ma-
terial to his defense, and that the lower court erred in keeping the
records from him. 06
A common thread throughout these cases is that in order to
compel witnesses or produce documents in the defendant's favor, the
defense must show how the witnesses or documents are or would be
"relevant and material . . . to [its] defense."1 0 7 The defendant must
articulate how a witness meets this standard, which is not easy for de-
fendants to do. For example, in Valenzuela-Bernal the potential wit-
nesses were deported before the defense had an opportunity to inter-
view them to determine the materiality of their potential testimony. 08
Even in the New York case of King, Cardinal O'Connor, who had
first hand knowledge of the demonstration, was considered to not
have relevant or material information because the court determined
that the testimony the defense sought from him had no bearing on
whether the demonstration caused a disturbance or actually impeded
the ability to observe mass.'09 Although the defense in King put forth
an argument as to how they believed his testimony would help their
defense, the court did not find the reason to be sufficient or convinc-
ing. Quite possibly, Cardinal O'Connor was not the best witness for
the defense to subpoena, considering the other duties that he was per-
forming during mass. Even though the jury has the designated role of
weighing the evidence, it appears that in many compulsory process
cases the judges are weighing the evidence. Although the defendant
may not be able to build a successful defense with the witnesses that
he seeks, it should be up to the jury and not the judge to determine
their value.
Public policy, discovery rules, and rules of evidence have
hindered many chances for defendants to subpoena witnesses in their
favor, but the Constitution should certainly be given greater defe-
105 Id. at 465-66.
106 id.
107 Washington, 388 U.S. at 16.
108 Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. at 861.
'0 King, 561 N.Y.S.2d at 397.
9888 [Vol. 26
12
Touro Law Review, Vol. 26 [2010], No. 3, Art. 16
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol26/iss3/16
COMPULSORY PROCESS
rence."o In Taylor, the defendant was deprived of his compulsory
process protection due to a discovery violation."' Understandably,
discovery rules are in place to promote fairness and efficiency; but
what seems to be blatantly unfair is the deprivation of one's constitu-
tional protections.
Even though the Zherka court does not clearly articulate the
underlying reason or reasons motivating Zherka to subpoena the DA,
it appears that the defense hoped to uncover an alleged conspiracy.
To this end, the defendant should have drafted the subpoena more
broadly rather than confining it to the October 31, 2008 arrest. Zher-
ka alleged misconduct on the part of the DA and wanted the chance
to question her about it, but the DA signed a sworn affirmation that
stated that she had no knowledge about the incident, which interfered
with any chance of subpoenaing her.11 2 It appears that the DA would
only be considered a favorable witness for the defense once he could
successfully impeach the DA on cross-examination (which would be
hard to accomplish). By signing the affirmation, the DA protected
herself from being called as a witness for the government or for the
defense. This is certainly frustrating to the defendant, to say the
least.
The Sixth Amendment establishes a division between material
witnesses that are "against" the criminal defendant and those "in his
favor.""'3 According to Peter Westen, this division places the burden
to produce witnesses against the defendant on the government and
witnesses in favor of the defense on the defendant. 114 In Zherka, the
110 Janet C. Hoeffel, The Sixth Amendment's Lost Clause: Unearthing Compulsory
Process, 2002 Wis. L. REv. 1275, 1301-02 (2002).
Indeed, the Court should not be involved in re-making the laws of evi-
dence; that is the duty of legislators. .. . The rules of evidence should not
dictate the substance of the Constitution, lest the Constitution have no
higher meaning. . . . [T]he Constitution should have overriding principles
that are easily and readily applied to evidentiary rulings, not for the pur-
pose of relitigating the evidentiary issues--such as whether the evidence
in the case was sufficiently reliable--but for injecting precepts of funda-
mental fairness that are broadly applicable.
Id. at 1301-02.
' Taylor, 484 U.S. at 401-02.
112 Zherka, 2009 WL 482366, at *2.
113 Peter Westen, Confrontation and Compulsory Process: A Unified Theory of Evidence
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allocation of this logical burden did not work in the defendant's fa-
vor. Since the government did not call the DA as a witness and be-
cause Zherka was unable to show that the DA's testimony would
have been material to his defense, Zherka was in a lose-lose situation.
According to Westen's analysis, Zherka should have been permitted
to call the DA to the stand and ask leading questions, because such
questions might have elicited "testimony in his favor.""'
All things considered, the court got it right in the case. The
criminal defendant's right to compel witnesses in his favor is not ab-
solute and may be limited not only by evidentiary rules, but also "by
the state's legitimate interest in efficient trials."' 1 6 To allow every
possible witness to testify without establishing how the witness's tes-
timony would be relevant and material at the outset of trial would
hinder the effectiveness of the trial process as a whole. However, af-
ter analyzing the federal courts' and New York courts' decisions, it
looks as if the Compulsory Process Clause has either been over-
looked or undervalued in many decisions as a vital right of criminal
defendants. Both the United States Supreme Court and New York
courts have created an overwhelming amount of barriers for defen-
dants who dare to exercise their rights under the Compulsory Process
Clause.
Michelle Kliegman
"'5 Id. at 613 (internal quotations omitted).
116 Mary Jane Wilson-Bilik & Craig Douglas Mills, Sixth Amendment Issues at Trial, 78
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